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1. Introduction	  	  	  The	   judgment	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   in	  Maktouf	   and	  Damjanović	   v.	  
Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina 1 	  presents	   two	   of	   the	   most	   interesting	   dynamics	   in	  contemporary	   international	   legal	   discourse:	   the	   tension	   between	   what	   Posner	   and	  Vermeule	   identified	   as	   ‘transitional	   justice’	   and	   ‘ordinary	   justice’;2	  and	   the	   tension	  between	  domestic	  transitional	  policies	  and	  extant	  (European)	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  It	  has	  also	   had	   the	   grotesque	   unintended	   consequence	   of	   people	   convicted	   of	   genocide	   at	  Srebrenica	  being	  released	  from	  prison.	  	  The	   main	   issue	   raised	   by	   the	  Maktouf	   and	   Damjanović	   case	   was	   on	   Article	   7	   ECHR:	  essentially	  the	  principle	  of	  nulla	  poena	  sine	  lege.	  	  Responding	  to	  complaints	  by	  convicted	  war	   criminals,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   (BiH),	   explicitly	   argued	   that	   the	   principle	   of	  non-­‐retroactivity	   should	   be	   set-­‐aside	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   justice,	   in	   relation	   to	   certain	  historical	   situations.3	  	   This	   is	   an	   especially	   clear	   argument	   that	   ‘transitional’	   justice	  should	   allow	   us	   to	   jettison	   long-­‐held	   assumptions	   that	   are	   core	   to	   ‘ordinary’	   justice.	  	  Likewise,	   given	   the	   context	   in	   which	   this	   claim	   was	   made	   –	   in	   argument	   before	   the	  European	  Court	   –	   it	   shows	  not	   only	   that	   there	   is	   potential	   for	   transitional	   policies	   to	  clash	   with	   international	   human	   rights	   law,	   but	   also	   that	   states	   are	   willing	   clearly	   to	  request	   special	   treatment	   on	   transitional	   grounds.	   	   Indeed	   we	   shall	   see	   that,	   with	  arguably	  inconvenient	  candour,	  the	  representatives	  of	  BiH	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  what	  the	  European	  Court	  had,	  in	  fact,	  allowed	  previously	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  7.	  	  	  This	   type	   of	   request	   for	   special	   treatment	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   a	   claim	   for	  ‘transitional	   relativism’,4	  by	   analogy	   to	   the	   more	   widely	   acknowledged	   claims	   for	  ‘cultural	  relativism’	  visible	  within	  European	  human	  rights	  law.5	  	  	  	  This	  comment	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  judgment	  in	  the	  case.	  	  We	  shall	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  case’s	  place	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  jurisprudence	  on	  Article	  7	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  PhD,	  Professor	  of	  International	  Law,	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  UK.	  	  This	  paper	  was	  drafted	  originally	  in	  autumn	  2013.	  	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  comments	  of	  Massimo	  Starita,	  with	  whom	  I	  discussed	  the	  wider	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  
Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  case	  during	  my	  visit	  to	  University	  of	  Palermo	  in	  October	  2014.	  1	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  v.	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  [2013]	  ECHR	  703	  2	  E	  Posner	  and	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  Ordinary	  Justice’	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  117	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  3	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  62	  4	  See	  J	  A	  Sweeney,	  The	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  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	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  Era:	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  in	  Transition	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	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  5	  J	  A	  Sweeney,	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  of	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  Cultural	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  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era’	  (2005)	  54	  International	  and	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  459	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ECHR,	  and	  then	  finally	  engage	  with	  the	  issues	  of	  candour,	  the	  ‘duty	  to	  prosecute’	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  transitional	  justice.	  	  
2. The	   facts	   and	   the	   judgment	   in	   Maktouf	   and	   Damjanović	   v.	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina	  
	  Background	  	  Both	  of	  the	  applicants	  in	  the	  case	  had	  been	  convicted	  of	  war	  crimes.	   	  In	  1993	  Maktouf	  had	   assisted	   in	   the	   kidnapping	   of	   two	   civilians,	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   exchanging	   them	   for	  members	   of	   the	   Army	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   (ARBH)	  who	  were	  being	  detained	  by	  the	  Croatian	  Defence	  Council.6	  	  The	  ARBH	  was	   largely	  comprised	  of	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  (Bosniaks).	  	  The	  other	  applicant,	  Damjanović,	  had	  played	  a	  significant	  role	   in	   the	   ill-­‐treatment	   of	   Bosniaks	   in	   Sarajevo,	   where	   in	   one	   incident	   lasting	   up	   to	  three	  hours	  the	  detainees	  were	  beaten	  with	  rifles,	  batons,	  bottles,	  kicks	  and	  punches.7	  	  Both	  applicants	  were	  convicted	  and	  sentenced	  by	  the	  State	  Court	  in	  BiH	  under	  the	  2003	  Criminal	   Code	   of	   Bosnia,	   rather	   than	   under	   the	   1976	   Criminal	   Code	   of	   the	   former	  Socialist	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (which	  was	  in	  force	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crimes).	  	  As	   part	   of	   the	   completion	   strategy	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   Former	  Yugoslavia	  war	  crimes	  chambers	  were	  established	  within	  the	  State	  Court,	  comprised	  of	  a	   mixture	   of	   international	   and	   local	   judges.	   Until	   2006,	   international	   judges	   were	  appointed	  directly	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  UN	  High	  Representative	   in	  BiH.	   	  The	  applicants	  challenged	   both	   the	   legal	   basis	   of	   the	   prosecution	   and	   sentence,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  appointment	  process	  of	  international	  judges.	  	  This	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  background	  prompts	  at	  least	  one	  immediate	  observation:	  the	  European	  Court	   took	   an	   interesting	   step	  by	   joining	   these	   cases,	   because	   although	   the	  applicants	  were	  making	  similar	  complaints	  before	  the	  European	  Court,	  they	  would	  have	  been	  on	  opposing	  sides	  during	  the	  conflict.	  	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  at	  various	  points	  in	   the	   past	   the	   European	   Court	   has	   been	   accused	   of	   taking	   a	   different	   stance	   on	   its	  application	   of	   Article	   7	   ECHR	   in	   transitional	   cases	   depending	   upon	  which	   side	   of	   the	  relevant	  conflict	  the	  applicant	  had	  fought.8	  	  Its	  approach	  in	  this	  case	  forecloses	  any	  such	  discussion.	  	  	  	  	  The	  applicants’	  main	  argument	  was	  that	  they	  had	  been	  sentenced	  according	  to	  the	  2003	  Criminal	  Code,	  which	  they	  argued	  was	  more	  stringent	  than	  the	  1976	  Criminal	  Code.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  neither	  applicant	  claimed	  that	  they	  were	  innocent	  of	  the	  crimes	  at	  issue.	  	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  observing,	   therefore,	   that	  although	  we	  shall	   see	   that	   the	  applicants	  both	  went	   on	   to	   win	   in	   relation	   to	   Article	   7	   ECHR,	   they	   were	   only	   contesting	   their	  punishment	   and	   so	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   had	   been	   found	   to	   be	   war	   criminals	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  11	  7	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  19	  8	  See	  e.g.	  the	  dissenting	  Opinion	  of	  Judges	  Fura-­‐Sandström,	  Davíd	  Thór	  Björgvinsson	  and	  Ziemele	  in	  Kononov	  v.	  Latvia	  (Chamber)	  [2008]	  ECHR	  695	  (which	  went	  on	  to	  influence	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  Chamber’s	  decision	  by	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  in	  Kononov	  v.	  
Latvia	  (GC)	  [2010]	  ECHR	  667).	  	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Sweeney	  op.	  cit,	  supra	  n4,	  pp	  63	  et	  
seq.	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undisturbed.	  	  Thus	  the	  European	  Court	  did	  not	  make	  any	  financial	  award	  under	  Article	  41,	  instead	  deciding	  that	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  judgment	  was	  a	  sufficient	  remedy	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  -­‐	  although	  both	  applicants	  were	  able	  to	  claim	  costs	  of	  €10,000.9	  	  Sadly	  this	  point	  seems	  to	   have	   been	   misunderstood	   by	   several	   news	   outlets,	   which	   have	   described	   the	  applicants	  as	  gaining	  €10,000	  in	  ‘compensation’.10	  	  	  Even	   more	   troublingly,	   the	   Bosnian	   authorities	   have	   reacted	   to	   the	   judgment	   by	  releasing	  from	  prison	  not	  only	  the	  applicants	  but	  several	  other	  people,	  pending	  re-­‐trial.	  	  It	   is	   reported	   that	   potentially	   hundreds	   of	   convicted	  war	   criminals	   could	   be	   released	  and	   re-­‐tried.11	  	   At	   least	   six	   of	   the	   people	   released	   already	   had	   been	   convicted	   of	  genocide	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre.	   	  This	  has	  attracted	  criticism	  from	  the	  Dutch	  Foreign	  Minister	  in	  particular	  (the	  Netherlands	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  Srebrenica	  when	  Bosnian	   Serb	   forces	   overran	   it	   and	   killed	   around	   8000	   Bosnian	   Muslim	   men	   and	  boys).12	  	  As	  we	  shall	   see,	   the	  European	  Court	  did	  not	   require	  such	  a	  drastic	   response,	  and	   in	   any	   event	   the	   judgment	   dealt	   only	   with	   war	   crimes	   and	   not	   crimes	   against	  humanity	  or	  genocide.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Arguments	  put	  to	  the	  European	  Court:	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  	  Maktouf	  alleged	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  as	  well	  as	  the	  principal	  allegation	  under	  Article	   7.	   	   We	   shall	   return	   to	   Article	   7	   shortly.	   	   The	   Article	   6	   argument	   was	   that	  international	   judges	   sitting	   in	   the	   State	   Court	   were	   not	   independent	   and	   impartial	  because	  they	  were	  appointed	  directly	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative,	  and	  for	  only	  two	  years.	  	  	  	  The	   European	   Court	   quickly	   agreed	   with	   the	   BiH	   Constitutional	   Court	   that	   this	  complaint	  was	  manifestly	  ill-­‐founded:	  although	  the	  international	  judges	  were	  appointed	  by	   the	   High	   Representative,	   the	   Court	   found	   no	   reason	   to	   question	   that	   they	   were	  independent	  of	  that	  institution;	  and	  moreover	  although	  the	  term	  of	  office	  was	  ‘relatively	  short’	  it	  was	  ‘understandable’	  given	  the	  provisional	  nature	  of	  international	  participation	  in	  the	  State	  Court	  and	  the	  practical	  modi	  operandi	  of	  international	  secondments.	  	  	  	  Further	   on	   in	   this	   comment	   we	   shall	   focus	   upon	   the	   Respondent	   State’s	   request	   for	  special	  treatment	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  7	  during	  the	  transition.	  	  However	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  even	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  the	  finding	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  6	  was	  affected	  by	  an	  element	  of	  transitional	   relativism,	  with	   the	  Court’s	   clear	   concession	   that	   the	   term	  of	  office	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  94	  10	  See	  e.g.	  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/maktouf-­‐and-­‐damjanovic-­‐bring-­‐down-­‐bosnian-­‐court-­‐practice	  (accessed	  4.10.2013)	  11	  See	  EU	  Business,	  ‘Bosnia	  survivors	  outraged	  over	  war	  criminals'	  release’,	  (4.12.2013)	  available	  at	  http://www.eubusiness.com/news-­‐eu/bosnia-­‐wacrimes.rx0	  (accessed	  4.12.2013)	  12	  See	  DutchNews.nl,	  ‘Dutch	  foreign	  minister	  “astounded”	  by	  Bosnian	  war	  criminal	  release’	  (21.11.2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/11/dutch_foreign_minister_astound.php	  (accessed	  5.12.2013)	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international	   judges	   was,	   although	   Convention-­‐compliant,	   nevertheless	   ‘admittedly’	  short.	  	  Arguments	  put	  to	  the	  European	  Court:	  Article	  7	  ECHR	  	  The	  main	  complaint	  by	  both	  applicants	  was	  that	  they	  had	  been	  sentenced	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  2003	  Criminal	  Code	  rather	  than	  the	  1976	  version.	  	  Crucially,	  they	  argued	  that	  the	   1976	   version	   was	   more	   lenient,	   so	   therefore	   their	   punishment	   was	   in	   direct	  contravention	   of	   the	   rule	   in	   Art	   7(1)	   ECHR	   prohibiting	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   heavier	  penalty	   than	   that	   applicable	   at	   the	   time	   an	   offence	   is	   committed.	   	   This	   reflects	   the	  general	  principle	  of	  lex	  mitior,	  according	  to	  which	  where	  the	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  accused	  has	  been	  changed	  the	   less	  severe	   law	  should	  be	  applied.13	  	  The	  applicants	  argued	  that	  the	  2003	  Code	  was	  more	  severe	  because	   it	  allowed	  for	  much	   longer	  sentences	   for	  the	  types	  of	  crime	  of	  which	  they	  had	  been	  convicted.	  	  	  Part	  of	   the	  confusion	   in	  the	  case	  stems	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  war	  crimes	  were	  being	  handled	   in	   BiH.	   	   An	   overriding	   principle	   in	   Article	   4	   of	   the	   2003	   BiH	   Criminal	   Code	  stipulates	  that	  laws	  that	  were	  applicable	  of	  the	  time	  of	  an	  offence	  should	  be	  used,	  unless	  the	   law	   has	   been	   amended;	   if	   it	   has	   been	   amended,	   then	   the	  more	   lenient	   provision	  should	  be	  applied.	   	  This	  again	  reflects	   the	  general	   legal	  principle	  of	   lex	  mitior	  or	   favor	  
libertatis.	   	  The	  problem	   is	   that	   the	  Entity	  Courts14	  almost	  always	  used	   the	  1976	  Code,	  whereas	  until	  2009	  the	  State	  Court	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  2003	  Code	  was	  always	  more	  lenient.15	  	   The	   core	   reason	   for	   the	   State	  Court’s	   conclusion	  on	   this	  point	  was	   that	   the	  1976	  Code	  included	  the	  death	  penalty	  for	  serious	  offences,	  whereas	  the	  2003	  Code	  does	  not.	  	  The	  applicants	  in	  the	  case,	  who	  recall	  were	  tried	  and	  sentenced	  by	  the	  State	  Court	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  respectively,	  disagreed	  with	  the	  view	  that	   the	  2003	  code	  was	  more	  lenient	   in	   their	   circumstances:	   they	   would	   never	   have	   been	   eligible	   for	   the	   death	  penalty.	  	  	  	  	  	  Regardless	   of	   whether	   the	   2003	   Code	   was	   the	   lex	  mitior	   in	   the	   applicants’	   cases,	   to	  which	   we	   shall	   return	   shortly,	   international	   bodies	   including	   the	   OSCE,	   UN	   Human	  Rights	   Committee	   and	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe’s	   ‘Venice	   Commission’	   had	   already	  expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  consistency	  inherent	  in	  this	  state	  of	  affairs.16	  	  The	  BiH	  government	  built	  upon	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  Maktouf’s	  domestic	  case,	  arguing	  that	  as	  long	  as	  an	  act	  was	  criminal	  under	  the	  general	  principles	  of	   law	   recognised	   by	   civilised	   nations	   and	   under	   national	   law,	   then	   Article	   7(2)	  permitted	   the	   application	   of	   a	   harsher	   sentence	   than	   that	   applicable	   at	   the	   time	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  Scoppola	  v.	  Italy	  (No.	  2)	  [2009]	  ECHR	  1297,	  but	  note	  the	  Partly	  Dissenting	  Opinion	  of	  Judge	  Nicolaou,	  joined	  by	  Judges	  Bratza,	  Lorenzen,	  Jočiené,	  Villiger	  and	  Sajó.	  14	  BiH	  comprises	  two	  ‘entities’,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  and	  the	  Republika	  Srpska.	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  self-­‐governing	  administrative	  unit	  of	  the	  Brčko	  district.	  15	  After	  March	  2009	  the	  State	  Court	  altered	  its	  approach,	  deeming	  that	  the	  1976	  Code	  was	  more	  lenient	  in	  relation	  to	  more	  minor	  offences,	  whereas	  the	  2003	  Code	  was	  more	  lenient	  in	  relation	  to	  serious	  offences.	  	  See	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  29	  16	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  31-­‐33	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offence.	   	   The	   Constitutional	   Court	   had	   been	   inspired	   by	   the	   unfortunate,	   but	   rather	  insignificant,	  admissibility	  decision	  of	  the	  European	  Court	   in	  Naletilić	  v.	  Croatia.17	  	  The	  decision	  concerned	  the	  ICTY	  prosecution	  of	  the	  notorious	  Croatian	  military	  commander	  Mladen	  Naletilić.	   	  In	  the	  decision,	  a	  European	  Court	  Chamber	  appeared	  to	  suggest	  that	  Article	  7(2)	  ECHR	  could	  bar	  the	  application	  of	  the	  second	  sentence	  of	  Article	  7(1).	  	  The	  reasoning	  was	  scant,	  and	  can	  be	  quoted	  in	  full	  thus:	  As	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  contention	  that	  he	  might	  receive	  a	  heavier	  punishment	  by	  the	  ICTY	  than	  he	  might	  have	  received	  by	  domestic	  courts	  if	  the	  latter	  exercised	  their	  jurisdiction	  to	  finalise	  the	  proceedings	  against	  him,	  the	  Court	  notes	  that,	  even	  assuming	  Article	  7	  of	  the	   Convention	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   present	   case,	   the	   specific	   provision	   that	   could	   be	  applicable	   to	   it	   would	   be	   paragraph	   2	   rather	   than	   paragraph	   1	   of	   Article	   7	   of	   the	  Convention.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  second	  sentence	  of	  Article	  7	  §	  1	  of	  the	  Convention	  invoked	  
by	  the	  applicant	  could	  not	  apply.	  	  [emphasis	  added]	  	  This	  is	  problematic	  because	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  itself	  would	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  Article	  7(2)	  is	  to	  confirm	  that,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  offence	  was	  recognised	  in	  international	   law,	   then	   trial	   and	   punishment	   can	   begin,	   albeit	   subject	   to	   and	   in	  conformity	  with	  Article	  7(1).	  	  There	  is	  consistent	  legal	  authority	  suggesting	  that	  the	  two	  paragraphs	   of	   Article	   7	   are	   interlinked	   in	   this	   way,	   and	   must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	  concordant	  manner.	  18	  	   	  Until	  Naletilić	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  that	  Article	  7(2)	  in	  some	  way	  allowed	  for	  the	  disapplication	  of	  Article	  7(1).	   	   It	  would	  seem	  Article	  7(2)	  in	  fact	  reiterates	  the	  principle	  of	  nulla	  poene	  sine	  lege,	  but	  clarifies	  that	   international	   law	  is,	  for	  these	  purposes,	  relevant	  ‘law’.	  	  The	  European	  Court	  must	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  misleading	  nature	  of	  the	  Naletilić	  admissibility	  decision.	  	  However	  it	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  BiH	  Constitutional	  Court	  should	   not	   have	   been	   influenced	   quite	   so	   heavily	   by	   this	   judicial	   infelicity.	   	   Although	  Naletilić	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  figure,	  the	  Naletilić	  admissibility	  decision	  is	  a	  very	  shaky	  legal	  basis	   for	   the	   proposition	  made	   in	  Maktouf	   and	  Damjanović.	   	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   Court	   in	  
Naletilić	   did	   not	   actually	   state	   that	   Article	   7	  was	  applicable	   in	   the	   case.	   	   Second,	   the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  Chamber	  was	  not	  reasoned	  by	  reference	  to	  any	  prior	  cases.	  	  	  Alongside	  attempting	  to	  interpret	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  7,	  the	  Government	  argued	  that,	   in	  the	   interests	   of	   justice,	   the	   principle	   of	   retroactivity	   could	   be	   ‘set	   aside’.19	  	   In	   other	  words,	  even	  if	  Article	  7(2)	  did	  not	  act	  as	  an	  exemption	  to	  Article	  7(1),	  then	  Article	  7(1)	  could	  be	  ignored	  if	  justice	  demanded	  it.	  	  This	  is	  a	  novel	  argument,	  based	  on	  transitional	  relativism.	   	  The	  Government’s	  position	  was	   that,	   ‘The	   rigidity	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐retroactivity	  […]	  had	  to	  be	  softened	  in	  certain	  historical	  situations	  so	  that	  this	  principle	  would	  not	  be	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equity.’20	  	  The	  same	  argument	  was	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative,	  which	  was	  a	  third	  party	  to	  the	  case.21	  	  The	  argument	  was	  unsuccessful,	  but	  it	  is	  this	  element	  of	  the	  case	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  need	   for	   a	   thorough	   examination	   of	   the	   case’s	   place	  within	   the	   pantheon	   of	   Article	   7	  jurisprudence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Naletilić	  v.	  Croatia	  (dec.),	  App	  no	  51891/99	  (ECtHR	  4	  May	  2000)	  18	  See	  e.g.	  Tess	  v.	  Latvia	  (dec.),	  App	  no.	  34854/02	  (ECtHR	  12	  December	  2002);	  Papon	  v.	  
France	  (dec.),	  App	  no.	  54210/00	  (ECtHR	  15	  November	  2001).	  19	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  62	  20	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  62	  21	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  32	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  The	  Reasoning	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  	  The	  European	  Court	  noted	   that	  Maktouf	  had	  been	  given	   the	   lowest	   sentence	  possible	  under	   the	  2003	  Code,	  and	   that	  Damjanović’s	   sentence	  was	  only	   just	  above	   the	   lowest	  level.	   	   It	   was	   therefore	   significant	   for	   the	   European	   Court	   that	   the	   1976	   Code	   was	  ‘without	  doubt’	  the	  more	  lenient	  in	  relation	  to	  minimum	  sentences.22	  	  They	  could	  have	  received	  the	  same	  sentences	  under	  the	  1976	  Code,	  but	  there	  was	  a	  real	  possibility	  that	  by	   applying	   the	   2003	   Code	   retrospectively	   the	   applicants	   had	   been	   put	   at	   a	  disadvantage.	  	  This	  was	  enough	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  7.	  	  The	   European	   Court	   also	   quickly,	   and	   rightly,	   clarified	   that	   Article	   7(2)	   is	   merely	   a	  ‘contextual	  clarification’23	  of	  the	  rule	  in	  Article	  7(1):	  there	  was	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  Article	  7(2)	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  a	  general	  exception	  to	  Article	  7(1).	  	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  explicitly	  overrule	  the	  Naletilić	  admissibility	  decision,	  but	  it	  is	  now	  beyond	  doubt	  that	  either	  it,	  or	  the	  BiH	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  it,	  was	  flawed.	  	  	  The	   Court	   equally	   firmly	   rejected	   the	   idea	   that	   deriving	   from	   international	  humanitarian	   law	   there	   could	   be	   a	   duty	   to	   punish	   war	   crimes	   adequately	   even	   in	  contravention	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐retroactivity.24	  	   However,	   rather	   than	   exploring	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  transitional	  societies	  need	  some	  transitional	  relativism,	  the	  Court	  made	  a	  straightforward	  legal	  argument	  based	  upon	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  Geneva	   Conventions	   themselves	   also	   contain	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐retroactivity.	   	   The	  concurring	  Opinion	  of	  Judge	  Ziemele	  explored	  recent	  developments	  in	  international	  law	  at	   greater	   length,	   noting	   the	   ‘growing	   consensus’	   regarding	   the	   international	   ‘duty	   to	  prosecute’	   the	  most	   serious	   international	   crimes.	   	  However,	   in	  her	   analysis	   this	  point	  was	   not	   relevant	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   case:	   the	   case	   could	   be	   decided	   simply	   by	  observing	  that	  at	  the	  relevant	  time	  the	  State	  Court	  did	  not	  have	  a	  practice	  of	  examining	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  which	  criminal	  code	  was	  the	  more	  lenient.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  European	  Court	  underestimated	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  international	  duty	  to	  prosecute,	  and	  so	  we	  shall	  return	  to	  this	  point	  shortly.	  	  There	   were	   two	   further	   concurring	   opinions.	   	   According	   to	   Judge	   Kalaydjieva	   the	  decisive	   issue	  was	   that	  of	   foreseeability.	   	  The	  existence	  of	   the	   two	  applicable	  criminal	  codes	  was	  sufficient	  to	  impede	  foreseeability	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  violating	  Article	  7	  ECHR.	  	  According	   to	   scholarly	   Concurring	   Opinion	   of	   Judge	   Pinto	   de	   Albuquerque,	   joined	   by	  Judge	  Vučinić,	   the	  violation	  of	   the	  Convention	  stemmed	  from	  the	  domestic	  authorities	  not	  having	  carried	  out	  a	  ‘global’	  assessment	  of	  which	  criminal	  code,	  in	  its	  entirety,	  was	  the	   more	   lenient	   (and,	   in	   their	   assessment	   in	   concreto,	   the	   1976	   code	   was	   the	   lex	  
mitior).	  	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  Judge	  Pinto	  de	  Albuquerque	  expressly	  rejected	  that	  domestic	   judges	   should	   be	   compelled	   to	   choose	   between	   the	   applicable	   codes	   on	   the	  facts	   of	   each	   case:	   rather	   they	   should	   make	   a	   ‘concrete	   and	   global’	   finding,	   for	   two	  important	  reasons:	  [F]irst,	   each	   punitive	   regime	   has	   its	   own	   rationale,	   and	   the	   judge	   cannot	   upset	   that	  rationale	   by	   mixing	   different	   rules	   from	   different	   successive	   penal	   laws;	   second,	   the	  judge	  cannot	  exceed	  the	  legislature’s	  function	  and	  create	  a	  new	  ad-­‐hoc	  punitive	  regime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  69	  23	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  72	  24	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para.	  74	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composed	   of	   a	  miscellany	   of	   rules	   deriving	   from	  different	   successive	   penal	   laws.	   (per	  Judge	  Albuquerque,	  joined	  by	  Judge	  Vučinić)	  	  	  This	   was	   not	   the	   only	   departure	   from	   the	   approach	   taken	   in	   the	   main	   body	   of	   the	  judgment.	  	  According	  to	  this	  concurring	  opinion,	  the	  applicants’	  convictions	  should	  have	  been	  declared	  null	  and	  void	  by	  the	  relevant	  national	  court,	  followed	  by	  a	  re-­‐trial.	   	  This	  was	   not	   the	   approach	   taken	   in	   the	   judgment	   itself	   which,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   dealt	  merely	  with	  costs	  and	  expenses	  under	  Article	  41	  ECHR.	   	  In	  recent	  years	  the	  Court	  has	  built	   upon	   the	   foundations	   of	   Article	   46	   to	   require	   specific	   actions	   from	   Respondent	  States.	  	  These	  have	  included	  individual	  measures	  such	  as	  to	  release	  a	  wrongly-­‐detained	  applicant,25	  and	  general	  measures	  up	  to	  and	  including	  so-­‐called	  ‘pilot	  judgments’.26	  	  No	  such	   further	   recommendation	   was	   made	   under	   Article	   46	   in	   the	   Maktouf	   and	  
Damjanović	   judgment.	   	  The	  fact	  that	  Judge	  Pinto	  de	  Albuquerque	  favoured	  release	  and	  re-­‐trial,	   and	   that	   the	  majority	   did	   not	   support	   this,	  makes	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bosnian	  authorities	  in	  releasing	  the	  ten	  prisoners	  all	  the	  more	  questionable.	  	  	  	  	  
3. The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Case	  	  The	  central	  feature	  of	  this	  case	  is	  the	  explicit	  rejection	  of	  the	  equally	  explicit	  arguments	  of	   BiH	   that	   transitional	   justice	   requires	   the	   suspension	   of	   otherwise	   perfectly	   valid	  human	  rights	   legal	   concepts.	   	  Let	  us	   first	   re-­‐tread	  briefly	   the	  definition	  of	   transitional	  justice.	  	  We	  shall	  then	  turn	  to	  two	  issues:	  the	  notion	  of	  candour;	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  ‘duty	  to	  prosecute’.	  	  Transitional	  Justice	  	  	  The	   present	   author	   has	   previously	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   best	   to	   separate	   two	   distinct	  meanings	  of	  ‘transitional	  justice’,	  and	  consequently	  two	  distinct	  approaches	  to	  studying	  it.27	  	   The	   UN	   has	   used	   the	   phrase	   as	   a	   collective	   label	   given	   to,	   ‘the	   full	   range	   of	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  associated	  with	  a	  society’s	  attempts	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  legacy	   of	   large-­‐scale	   past	   abuses,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   accountability,	   serve	   justice	   and	  achieve	  reconciliation’.28	  	  They	  include	  policies	  such	  as	   lustration	  and	  reparations	  –	  as	  well	  as	  war	  crimes	  trials.	  	  There	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  literature	  on	  best-­‐practice	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  policies,	  which	  overlaps	  with	  the	  related	  areas	  of	  security	  sector	  reform	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  more	  generally.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Assanidze	  v.	  Georgia	  (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  32,	  para.	  43,	  but	  note	  the	  partly	  concurring	  opinion	  of	  Judge	  Costa.	  	  26	  See	  e.g.	  Broniowski	  v.	  Poland	  (2005)	  40	  EHRR	  21	  	  27	  See	  Sweeney	  op.	  cit,	  supra	  n4,	  p22	  28	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General:	  The	  Rule	  of	  law	  and	  transitional	  justice	  in	  conflict	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  societies,	  UN	  Doc	  S/2004/616,	  4	  	  29	  C.	  Bell,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  Peace	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  2008);	  R.	  Brooks,	  Can	  Might	  Make	  Rights?	  Building	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  After	  Military	  Interventions	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2006);	  A	  Cassese,	  The	  Special	  Court	  and	  International	  Law:	  The	  Decision	  Concerning	  the	  Lome	  Agreement	  Amnesty’	  (2004)	  2	  Journal	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Justice	  1130;	  R	  Cryer	  ‘Post-­‐Conflict	  Accountability:	  a	  Matter	  of	  Judgement,	  Practice	  or	  Principle’,	  in	  ND	  White	  and	  D	  Klaasen	  (eds)	  The	  UN,	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Situations	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  267	  -­‐289;	  J	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	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  A	   second	   view	   is	  more	   normative	   in	   nature.	   	   It	   enquires	  more	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  ‘justice’	   revealed	   by	   these	   transitional	   policies:	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  observe	  a	  form	  of	  justice	  that	  is	  both	  qualified	  by	  and	  constitutive	  of	  the	  transition	  itself.	  	  Under	  this	  second	  view	  transitional	   justice	  is	  thus	  the,	   ‘conception	  of	  justice	  associated	  with	   periods	   of	   political	   change,	   characterized	   by	   legal	   responses	   to	   confront	   the	  wrongdoings	  of	  repressive	  predecessor	  regimes.’30	  	  Ruti	  Teitel	  has	  been	  instrumental	  in	  identifying	  this	  form	  of	   justice,	   in	  relation	  to	  which	  it	   is	  crucial	  to	  note	  Teitel’s	  further	  observation	  that	  such	  forms	  of	  justice	  may	  often	  be	  ‘partial	  and	  nonideal’.31	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  studying	  transitional	   justice	   is	  about	  unpicking	   its	   internal	  contradictions	  and	  awkward	  compromises.	  	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  Comment	  a	  brief	  mention	  was	  made	  of	  Posner	  and	  Vermeule’s	  oft-­‐cited	  work	   on	   ‘Transitional	   justice	   as	   ordinary	   justice’.	   	   Their	   key	   contention	  was	  that	   transitional	   justice	   policies	   are	   defensible	   because	   they	   can	   be	   placed	   along	   a	  spectrum	   that	  would	   see	   them	  merely	   as	   notable	   elements	   of	   ‘ordinary	   justice’.32	  	   On	  their	   reading	   of	   the	   situation,	   the	   prima	   facie	   rule	   of	   law	   dilemmas	   presented	   by	  transitional	  justice	  (and	  which,	  for	  Teitel,	  embody	  their	  non-­‐idealism)	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  using	  comparators	  from	  non-­‐transitional	  legal	  systems.	  	  The	  present	  author’s	  view	  is	  that	  Posner	  and	  Vermeule	  underestimated	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  dilemmas	  in	  a	  transitional	   society:	   whilst	   it	   might	   be	   possible	   to	   find	   ‘ordinary’	   comparators	   for	  ‘transitional’	  policies,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  find	  them	  all	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  in	  the	  
same	   state	   (Posner	   and	   Vermeule’s	   comparators	   have	   a	   wide	   historical	   and	  geographical	   range).	   	   Nevertheless,	   their	   identification	   of	   legal	   techniques	   commonly	  adopted	   in	   transitional	   societies	   is	   helpful,	   even	   if	   ultimately	   we	   disagree	   on	   their	  significance.	  	  	  	  	  The	  Representatives	  for	  the	  Government	  of	  BiH	  were	  clearly	  aware	  of	  the	  key	  cases	  on	  Article	  7	  mentioned	  above,	  such	  as	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  v.	  Germany33	  and	  the	  K-­‐H	  
W	  case.34	  	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  &	  Krenz	  and	  K-­‐H	  W	  dealt	  with	  murders	  at	  the	  Berlin	  wall,	  and	  it	  set	  the	  pattern	  for	  many	  subsequent	  cases	  that	  were	  based	  on	  convictions	  rooted	  in	  crimes	  defined	  by	   international	   law.35	  	  However	   there	  was	  a	  second,	  more	  distinctive,	  element	  to	  the	  case.	   	  The	  applicants	  were	  convicted	  on	  a	  strict	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2003);	  C	  Romano,	  A	  Nollkaemper,	  and	  J	  Kleffner	  (eds),	  Internationalized	  Criminal	  Courts:	  Sierra	  Leone,	  East	  Timor,	  Kosovo	  and	  Cambodia	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  2004);	  C	  Stahn,	  ‘Justice	  under	  Transitional	  Administration:	  Contours	  and	  Critique	  of	  a	  Paradigm’,	  in	  H.	  Fischer	  and	  N.	  Quenivet	  (eds),	  Post-­‐conflict	  Reconstruction:	  Nation-­‐	  and/or	  State-­‐Building,	  (Berlin:	  Berliner	  Wissenschafts-­‐Verlag,	  2005)	  141	  –	  167.	  	  NB	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  my	  co-­‐editor	  Dr	  Matthew	  Saul	  for	  elements	  of	  this	  short	  bibliography	  which	  was	  compiled	  for	  our	  forthcoming	  book:	  M	  Saul	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  (OUP,	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  32	  E	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  and	  A	  Vermeule,	  op.	  cit.	  supra,	  n2,	  761	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  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  v.	  Germany	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  31	  34	  K-­‐H	  W	  v.	  Germany	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  59	  35	  These	  cases	  are	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  Sweeney	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n4.	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domestic	  law	  applicable	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  particular	  killings.	  	  The	  applicants	  in	  the	  first	  case	   were	   senior	   leaders	   of	   the	   GDR,	   who	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	   overall	   security	  policy	   at	   the	  Berlin	  Wall.	   	   The	   applicant	   in	  K-­‐H	  W	   had	  been	   a	   young	   solider	  when,	   in	  1972,	  he	  shot	  in	  the	  head	  an	  escapee	  attempting	  to	  swim	  to	  West	  Germany	  via	  the	  river	  Spree,	  who	  subsequently	  drowned.	  The	  central	  contention	  of	  all	  the	  applicants,	  in	  both	  cases,	  was	   that	   their	   convictions	   after	  German	   reunification	  were	   in	   contravention	   of	  Article	   7	   ECHR:	   they	   had	   been	   acting	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   GDR	   law	   at	   it	   was	  understood	   at	   the	   time;	   and	   the	   offences	  were	   not	  made	   out	   under	   international	   law	  either.	   	   The	   applicants	   could	   never	   have	   foreseen	   the	   ex	   post	   facto	   strict	   re-­‐interpretation	  of	  the	  applicable	  law	  to	  cover	  the	  relevant	  killings.	  	  	  Let	  us	  consider	  the	  point	  about	  foreseeability.	  	  The	  German	  domestic	  courts	  had	  applied	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  as	  it	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  offences.	  	  However,	  state	  practice	  at	  the	   time	   (mandated	   by,	   amongst	   others,	   Streletz,	   Kessler	   and	   Krenz	   themselves)	   ran	  contrary	  to	  the	  law,	  and	  soldiers	  like	  K-­‐HW	  who	  killed	  escapees	  were	  duly	  rewarded	  for	  their	  lethal	  diligence.36	  	  They	  clearly	  did	  not	  ‘foresee’	  that	  the	  Berlin	  wall	  would	  fall,	  and	  that	  the	  stoic	  resistance	  of	  the	  East	  German	  populace	  would	  be	  rewarded	  a	  few	  weeks	  later	   by	   the	   great	   David	   Hasselhof	   belting	   out	   songs	   atop	   the	   remains	   of	   the	  wall	   in	  celebration	  of	  the	  New	  Year.37	  	  This	   left	   the	   German	   judiciary	   with	   a	   choice	   about	   how	   to	   address	   the	   element	   of	  retroactivity	   in	   the	   ‘unforeseeable’	   prosecutions.	   	   As	   Posner	   and	   Vermeule	   observed,	  courts	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  must,	   ‘either	  openly	  acknowledge	  retroactivity	  or	  else	  resort	  to	   a	   variety	   of	   legal	   techniques	   designed	   to	   sidestep	   or	   eliminate	   the	   retroactivity	  problem.’	  38	  	   Amongst	   these	   legal	   techniques	   Posner	   and	   Vermeule	   identified	   ‘taking	  nominal	  law	  seriously’	  and	  ‘an	  appeal	  to	  a	  higher	  law’	  (such	  as	  international	  law).	  	  The	  German	   courts	   took	   both	   approaches:	   the	   nominally	   applicable	  GDR	   law	   criminalised	  the	  actions	  in	  question,	  even	  if	  at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  not	  being	  interpreted	  to	  do	  so;	  and	  the	  actions	  were	  clearly	  contrary	  to	  international	  law.	  	  	  	  The	   issue	   for	   the	  European	  Court,	   if	   it	  was	   to	   square	   the	  domestic	   prosecutions	  with	  Article	   7	   ECHR,	   was	   thus	   whether	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   there	   was	   a	   surmountable	  element	  of	  retroactivity	  in	  the	  convictions	  (that	  is,	  to	  concede	  an	  element	  of	  transitional	  relativism),	   or	   to	   deny	   wholesale	   that	   there	   was	   even	   a	   whiff	   of	   retroactivity.	   	   The	  European	  Court	  was	  rather	  ambiguous	  on	  this,	  which	  may	  have	  given	  the	  government	  of	  BiH	   the	   confidence	   in	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	   to	   request	   the	  disapplication	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐retroactivity	  altogether.	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  the	  issue	  of	  candour	  arises.	  	  Candour	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  In	  the	  form	  of	  medals,	  cash	  rewards,	  and	  extra	  holidays	  (see	  the	  facts	  in	  Streletz,	  
Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  op.	  cit	  supra	  n33,	  para.	  23).	  37	  For	  the	  megastar’s	  continued	  involvement	  in	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  wall,	  see	  http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/19/david-­‐hasselhoff-­‐berlin-­‐wall-­‐fall	  (accessed	  8.10.2013)	  38	  Posner	  and	  Vermeule’s	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  both	  approaches	  are	  predicated	  on	  a	  false	  premise:	  that	  elements	  of	  retroactivity	  are	  wholly	  absent	  in	  established	  legal	  systems.	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In	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  the	  European	  Court	  reasoned	  that	  a	  transitional	  state,	  cannot	   be	   criticised	   for	   applying	   and	   interpreting	   the	   legal	   provisions	   in	   force	   at	   the	  material	  time	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  principles	  governing	  a	  State	  subject	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  From	  this	  starting	  point,	   the	  European	  Court	   in	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	   likened	   the	  ‘new’	   interpretation	  of	   the	   relevant	  GDR	   law	   to	   the	   gradual	   evolution	  of	   criminal	   law	  that	   it	   had	   approved	   in	   previous	   cases.39	  	   In	   other	   words,	   although	   there	   was	   a	  transitional	  dimension	  to	  the	  case,	  the	  European	  Court	  subsumed	  the	  German	  approach	  within	   its	   existing	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   gradual	   clarification	   of	   offences	   in	   ‘ordinary’,	  non-­‐transitional,	  cases.	  	  	  	  This	  was	   a	   clever	   legal	   technique	   for	   ‘sidestepping’	   the	   retroactivity	   element,	   such	   as	  Posner	   and	   Vermeule	   had	   observed	   in	   domestic	   cases.	   	   It	   disguised	   the	   element	   of	  transitional	   relativism	   that	   the	   Court’s	   reasoning	   implicitly	   condoned.	   	   Despite	   this	  sidestep,	   the	   Government	   in	  Maktouf	   and	   Damjanović	   cited	   the	   Streletz,	   Kessler	   and	  
Krenz	  case	  specifically	  as	  authority	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  justice,	  the	  principle	  of	   retroactivity	  could	  be	  set	  aside.40	  	  Was	   this	  a	  mistake?	   	  Probably	  not:	   it	   is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  Government	  in	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  were	  simply	  candid,	  such	  as	   the	   outspoken	   child	   in	   the	   Hans	   Christian	   Andersen	   tale	   of	   the	   ‘Emperor’s	   new	  clothes’.41	  	  	  Let	  me	  explain.	  	  It	  is	  legally	  the	  case	  that	  previous	  judgments	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  had	  indeed	   condoned	   the	   gradual	   development	   of	   the	   criminal	   law.42	  	   However,	   the	   clear	  
volte-­‐face	   concerning	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   GDR	   criminal	   law	   was	   anything	   but	  gradual.	   	   It	   represented	  a	   clear	   -­‐	   and	  quite	   intentional	   -­‐	   break	  with	   the	  past	   timed	   to	  coincide	   with	   reunification.	   	   This	   is	   why	   the	   European	   Court	   in	   Streletz,	   Kessler	   and	  
Krenz	   further	   stressed	   the,	   ‘pre-­‐eminence	   of	   the	   right	   to	   life’	   in	   international	   human	  rights	   instruments,	   as	   a	   factor	   counting	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   German	   courts’	   ‘strict’	  interpretation	   of	   Article	   7	   being	   subsumed	   within	   the	   earlier	   cases	   on	   the	   gradual	  development	   of	   the	   criminal	   law.43	  	   Thus,	   formally	   speaking,	   the	   European	   Court	  maintained	  the	  appearance	  of	  dispensing	  ‘ordinary	  justice’	  but	  it	  was	  perfectly	  obvious	  to	   any	   observer	   that	   this	   was	   not	   the	   whole	   story.	   	   It	   is	   just	   that	   no	   one	   chose	   to	  emphasise	   that	   point.	   	   Just	   like	   the	   boy	   in	   the	   ‘Emperor’s	   new	   clothes’,	   the	   BiH	  government	  chose	  to	  say	  what	  everyone	  else	  was	  thinking,	  but	  had	  been	  too	  bashful	  to	  declare.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Government	   in	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  therefore	  can	  be	   forgiven	   for	  misreading	  the	   European	   Court’s	   signals	   in	   this	   regard:	   after	   all,	   they	   merely	   relied	   on	   Streletz,	  
Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  as	  they	  saw	  it:	  evidence	  that	  the	  European	  Court’s	  standards	  could	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  op.	  cit	  supra	  n33,	  para.	  82	  40	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para	  62	  41	  In	  the	  story,	  no	  one	  except	  the	  child	  dares	  to	  say	  that	  the	  new	  clothes	  that	  the	  king	  has	  been	  conned	  into	  buying	  are,	  in	  fact	  non-­‐existent,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  king	  completely	  naked.	  	  See	  the	  materials	  presented	  by	  the	  Hans	  Christian	  Andersen	  Centre	  at	  http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html	  (accessed	  19.11.2013)	  42	  See	  SW	  v.	  UK	  (1996)	  21	  EHRR	  363,	  para.	  36	  43	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  op.	  cit	  supra	  n33,	  para.	  85	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modulated	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  imperatives	  of	  transitional	  states.	  	  They	  were	  not	  rewarded	  for	  their	  candour.	  	  	  The	  Duty	  to	  Prosecute	  	  Since	  the	  judgment	  in	  the	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  case	  back	  in	  2001	  there	  have	  been	  significant	   developments	   regarding	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘duty	   to	   prosecute’.	   	   Indeed,	   even	   in	  
Streletz,	   Kessler	   and	   Krenz,	   and	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   its	   conclusions	   in	   relation	   to	  Article	  7,	   the	  European	  Court	  drew	  attention	   to	  wider	   sources	  of	  public	   international	  law	   including	  the	  UDHR	  and	  ICCPR	  to	  conclude	  that	   the	  right	   to	   life	   is,	   ‘an	   inalienable	  attribute	   of	   human	   beings	   and	   forms	   the	   supreme	   value	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   human	  rights’.44	  	  	  The	   ‘duty	   to	   prosecute’,	   as	   a	   tangible	   legal	   duty,	   was	   expressed	   clearly	   as	   early	   as	  Orentlicher’s	  1991	  piece	  in	  The	  Yale	  Law	  Journal.45	  	  Orentlicher	  herself	  has	  revisited	  the	  argument	  inter	  alia	  in	  her	  role	  as	  the	  UN’s	  Independent	  Expert	  to	  Update	  the	  Principles	  to	   Combat	   Impunity46	  and	   in	   her	   reflective	   piece	   in	   the	   inaugural	   edition	   of	   the	  
International	   Journal	  of	  Transitional	   Justice.47	  	  The	   argument	   is	   that	   by	   combining	   the	  specific	  treaty	  duties	  to	  prosecute	  certain	  international	  crimes;	  the	  positive	  obligations	  deriving	  from	  human	  rights	  treaties;	  and	  customary	  international	   law,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  deduce	   an	   international	   legal	   duty	   to	   prosecute	   perpetrators	   of	   human	   rights	  violations.48	  	  	  The	  notion	  of	   a	  duty	   to	  prosecute	  has	  gained	   international	  political	   acceptance	   in	   the	  form	   not	   only	   of	   the	   Orentlicher-­‐influenced	   2005	   ‘Updated	   Set	   of	   principles	   for	   the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights	  through	  action	  to	  combat	  impunity’	  but	  also	  the	  UN’s	  2005	  ‘Basic	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  a	  Remedy	  and	  Reparation	  for	   Victims	   of	   Gross	   Violations	   of	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Law	   and	   Serious	  Violations	  of	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law’.	  	  Paragraph	  4	  of	  the	  latter	  states	  that,	  In	  cases	  of	  gross	  violations	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  and	  serious	  violations	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  constituting	  crimes	  under	  international	  law,	  States	  have	  the	   duty	   to	   investigate	   and,	   if	   there	   is	   sufficient	   evidence,	   the	   duty	   to	   submit	   to	  prosecution	  the	  person	  allegedly	  responsible	  for	  the	  violations	  and,	   if	   found	  guilty,	   the	  duty	  to	  punish	  her	  or	  him.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	   these	  developments	   to	  which	   the	  government	  of	  BiH	  may	  have	  been	   referring	   in	  
Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović,	  when	  they	  argued	  that	   there	  was	  a	  duty	  under	   international	  humanitarian	  law	  to	  punish	  war	  crimes	  adequately.49	  	  Clearly	  the	  above-­‐quoted	  portion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  op.	  cit	  supra	  n33,	  para.	  94;	  The	  Court	  also	  undertook	  a	  similar	  exercise	  in	  relation	  to	  freedom	  of	  movement	  as	  a	  human	  right.	  45	  See	  D	  Orentlicher,	  ‘Settling	  Accounts:	  The	  Duty	  to	  Prosecute	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  of	  a	  Prior	  Regime’	  (1991)	  100(8)	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  2537	  46	  UN	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Report	  of	  the	  independent	  expert	  to	  update	  the	  Set	  
of	  Principles	  to	  combat	  impunity,	  18	  February	  2005,	  E/CN.4/2005/102,	  available	  at:	  http://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66e7a0.html	  (accessed	  19.11.2013)	  47	  D	  Orentlicher,	  ‘“Settling	  Accounts”	  revisted:	  Reconciling	  Global	  Norms	  with	  Local	  Agency’	  (2007)	  1	  International	  Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  10	  48	  See	  Orentlicher	  op.	  cit.,	  supra,	  n47	  49	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n1,	  para	  62	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of	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  does	  not	  include	  the	  phrase,	  ‘punish	  adequately’	  but	  it	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  read	  the	  Principles	  in	  any	  other	  way.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  recalling	  that	  the	  UN’s	  Office	  of	   the	   High	   Representative	   in	   BiH	   had	   also	   argued,	   as	   a	   third	   party,	   that	   the	   acts	  committed	  by	  the	  present	  applicants	  were	  criminal	  under	  ‘the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  recognised	   by	   civilised	   nations’	   and	   that	   therefore	   the	   rule	   of	   non-­‐retroactivity	   of	  punishments	   did	   not	   apply	   in	   the	   case.	   	   The	   European	   Court	  merely	   responded	   that	  there	  was,	  	  no	  need	  to	  examine	  in	  any	  detail	  the	  Government’s	  further	  argument	  that	  a	  duty	  under	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  to	  punish	  war	  crimes	  adequately	  required	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  non-­‐retroactivity	  be	  set	  aside	  in	  this	  case.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  disappointing	  because	  it	   is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  an	  earlier	  legal	  regime	  might	  be	  the	   lex	  mitior	  precisely	  because	   it	  punished	   international	  crimes	   inadequately	  (and	  not	  just	  less	  severely).	  	  It	  would	  have	  taken	  little	  drafting	  ingenuity	  to	  add	  a	  caveat	  such	  that	   the	   European	   Court’s	   conclusions	   were	   tempered	   by	   recent	   developments	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   ‘duty	   to	   prosecute’	   and	   that,	   were	   the	   application	   of	   the	   lex	  mitior	   as	  regards	   punishment	   to	   lead	   to	   inadequate	   punishment	   of	   an	   international	   crime,	   the	  Court	  would	  come	  to	  a	  different	  conclusion.	  	  	  	  The	  failure	  to	  make	  this	  clarification	  has	  left	  the	  European	  Court	  at	  odds	  not	  only	  with	  a	  burgeoning	  consensus	  on	  the	  duty	  to	  prosecute,	  but	  also	  some	  of	  its	  Chamber	  decisions	  including,	  for	  example,	  Association	  21	  Decembre	  et	  al	  v.	  Romania.50	  	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  the	  European	  Court	   took	  a	   forceful	  approach	   to	  a	   stalled	   investigation	   into	  deaths	  arising	  from	  the	  successful	  revolution	  against	  Nicolae	  Ceaușescu	  in	  1989.	  	  The	  European	  Court	  stressed	  that	  the	  procedural	  obligation	  arising	  from	  Article	  2	  ECHR	  could	  stretch	  back	  to	  investigating	  massive	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  that	  took	  place	  even	  before	  a	  state	  signed	   the	  Convention	   (as	   long	  as	   enough	  of	   the	  procedural	   flaws	   took	  place	  after	   its	  signature	   and	   ratification).51	  	   The	   positive	   obligation	  was	   inspired	   by	   the	   right	   of	   the	  victims	   to	   know	   what	   had	   happened,	   and	   implied	   the	   right	   to	   an	   effective	   judicial	  investigation	   and	   a	   possible	   right	   to	   compensation.52	  	   Although	   not	   an	   obligation	   of	  result,	  	  any	  ensuing	  investigation	  must	  be	  impartial,	  include	  a	  careful	  examination	  of	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	   the	  killings,	  and	  be	  capable	  of	   leading	   to	   the	   identification	  
and	  punishment	  of	  those	  responsible.53	  	  Again,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  interpret	  this	  advice	  as	  requiring	  anything	  other	  than	  effective	  punishment.	  	  Even	  more	   recently,	   in	   the	   extraordinary	   rendition	   case	   of	  El-­‐Masri	  v.	  FYR	  Macedonia	  the	  Court	  drew	  attention	  again	  to	  the	  ‘right	  to	  truth’.54	  	  The	  prosecution	  and	  punishment	  of	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  massive	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  a	  powerful	  means	  of	  setting	  out	   the	   events	   of	   the	   past,	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   it,	   and	   discouraging	   similar	   future	  conduct.55	  	  However	  these	  developments,	  on	  an	  overarching	  right	  to	  truth	  linked	  to	  the	  positive	  obligations	  emanating	  from	  the	  procedural	  limb	  of	  Article	  2	  ECHR,	  and	  from	  the	  treatment	  of	  victims	  (or	  surviving	  or	  descendent	  family	  members)	  under	  Article	  3	  ECHR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Association	  21	  December	  1989	  &	  Others	  v	  Romania,	  App	  nos	  33810/07	  and	  18817/08	  (ECtHR,	  24	  May	  2011)	  51	  Association	  21	  December	  1989	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n50,	  para.	  86	  52	  Association	  21	  December	  1989	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n50,	  para.	  104	  53	  Association	  21	  December	  1989	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n50,	  para.	  25	  54	  El-­‐Masri	  v.	  the	  former	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  25	  55	  Orentlicher	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n45,	  p2542	  
©	  James	  A	  Sweeney	  2013	   13	  
may	  have	   come	   to	   a	   shuddering	  halt	   after	   the	  Grand	  Chamber	   judgement	   in	   Janowiec	  
and	  Others	   v.	   Russia,	  where	   the	   European	   Court	   declined	   to	   find	   a	   violation	   of	   either	  Article	   2	   or	   3	   ECHR	   in	   applications	   brought	   by	   family	   members	   of	   the	   thousands	   of	  Polish	  prisoners	  of	  war	  executed	  in	  the	  notorious	  Katyn	  massacre	  in	  1940.56	  	  	  	  
4. Conclusion:	  Recognising	  Transitional	  Relativism	  	  	  This	   case	   comment	   began	   by	   introducing	   the	  Maktouf	   and	   Damjanović	   v.	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina.	   	   Subsequently	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   case	   raises	   interesting	   questions	  about	  the	  recognition	  of	  transitional	  relativism,	  and	  the	  ‘duty	  to	  prosecute’.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  former	  we	  saw	  that	  on	  the	  Article	  6	  point	  the	  European	  Court	  appeared	  to	  allow	  some	  flexibility	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘admittedly	  short’	  term	  of	  office	  international	  judges	  in	  the	  BiH	  State	  Court,	  but	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  7	  denied	  that	  such	  flexibility	  could	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	   render	   Article	   7(1)	   inapplicable	   where	   the	   interests	   of	   (transitional)	   justice	  apparently	  required	  it.	  	  	  	  These	  observations	  highlight	  the	  lack	  of	  consistency	  in	  the	  European	  Court’s	  approach	  to	  transitional	   justice	  and	  transitional	  relativism.	   	  Sometimes	  the	  European	  Court	  has:	  1)	   appeared	   explicitly	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   interests	   of	   transitional	   justice	   justify	  departures	  from	  the	  standards	  that	  apply	  in	  non-­‐transitional	  states;	  2)	  implicitly	  made	  the	  acknowledgement,	  such	  as	  in	  Streletz,	  Kessler	  and	  Krenz	  v.	  Germany	  and;	  3)	  in	  other	  cases	   the	   Court	   has	   denied	   it	   altogether.	   	   This	   comment	   has	   examined	   the	   second	  category	  already,	  but	  let	  us	  briefly	  contrast	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third.	  	  There	   are	   several	   examples	   of	   the	   first	   category,	   where	   the	   European	   Court	   has	  apparently	  conceded	  an	  element	  of	  transitional	  relativism.57	  	  Perhaps	  the	  clearest	  is	  the	  2006	  Grand	  Chamber	  judgment	  in	  Ždanoka	  v.	  Latvia.58	  	  The	  case	  concerned	  limitations	  imposed	   upon	   a	   communist	   politician’s	   electoral	   rights	   under	   Article	   3	   of	   Protocol	   1	  ECHR.	  	  In	  finding	  that	  the	  limitations	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  Convention,	  the	  European	  Court	  observed	  that,	  While	   such	   a	   measure	   may	   scarcely	   be	   considered	   acceptable	   in	   the	   context	   of	   one	  political	   system,	   for	   example	   in	   a	   country	   which	   has	   an	   established	   framework	   of	  democratic	   institutions	   going	   back	  many	   decades	   or	   centuries,	   it	  may	   nonetheless	   be	  considered	  acceptable	  in	  Latvia	  in	  view	  of	  the	  historico-­‐political	  context	  which	  led	  to	  its	  adoption	  […].59	  	  The	   case	   has	   been	   discussed	   at	   length	   elsewhere,60 	  but	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  comment	  it	  suffices	  to	  observe	  that	  this	  is	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  that	  the	  European	  Court	  can,	  when	   it	   so	   chooses,	  modulate	   its	   standards	   in	   such	   a	  way	   as	   to	   accommodate	   a	  degree	  of	  transitional	  relativism.	  	  However,	  the	  European	  Court	  is	  not	  always	  so	  generous.	  	  Thus,	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  third	  category	  outlined	  above,	  where	  a	  request	  for	  transitional	  relativism	  is	  rejected	  outright.	  	  	  Such	   an	   approach	   is	   visible,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   cases	  of	  Beshiri	  v.	  Albania	  and	  Nuri	  v.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Janowiec	  and	  Others	  v.	  Russia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  30	  57	  See	  generally	  Sweeney	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n44	  58	  Ždanoka	  v.	  Latvia	  [2006]	  ECHR	  231	  	  59	  Ždanoka	  v.	  Latvia	  op.	  cit,	  supra	  n	  58,	  para.	  133	  60	  See	  generally	  Sweeney	  op.	  cit.,	  supra	  n44	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Albania,	   both	   of	   which	   concerned	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Albanian	   state	   to	   enforce	   the	  decisions	   of	   local	   Property	   Restitution	   and	   Compensation	   Commissions,	   which	   had	  awarded	  compensation	  to	  the	  applicants.	  	  In	  Beshiri	  the	  Government	  drew	  attention	  to,	  ‘objective	  circumstances	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  funds	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  community.’61	  	  In	  Nuri,	  the	  Government	  pleaded	  both	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  6	  and	  Article	  1,	  Protocol	  1,	  that,	  	  the	   process	   of	   restitution	   and	   compensation	   could	   not	   occur	   overnight	   and	  spontaneously,	  and	  that	   the	  delays	  associated	   therewith	  were	  related	   to	   the	   transition	  process	  the	  country	  was	  going	  through.62	  	  	  	  The	  European	  Court	  rejected	  both	  pleas	   for	  clemency	  and	  thus,	   in	   these	  cases,	  denied	  that	   Convention	   standards	   could	   be	   loosened	   to	   accommodate	   the	   difficult	  circumstances	  of	  democratic	  transition.	  	  The	  contrast	  between	  the	  first	  and	  third	  categories	  of	  cases	  here	  outlined	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	   contrast	   between	   the	  ECtHR’s	   approach	   to	  Article	   6	   and	  Article	   7	   in	  Maktouf	  and	  
Damjanović.	  	  This	  observation	  reinforces	  the	  impression	  that	  Maktouf	  and	  Damjanović	  is	  yet	  another	  case	  where	  the	  European	  Court	  has	  grappled	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  but	  has	  not	  clearly	  or	  consistently	  articulated	  in	  which	  circumstances	  it	  will,	  or	  will	  not,	  concede	  an	  element	  of	  transitional	  relativism.	  	  	  It	   is	   likely	   that	   this	   ambiguity	   will	   continue	   unless	   and	   until	   the	   European	   Court	  acknowledges,	  and	  begins	  explicitly	  to	  interact	  with,	  the	  concept	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  	  At	  present	  the	  European	  Court	  has	  never	  referred	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  transitional	  justice	  in	   its	   reasoning	   (a	  HUDOC	   search	   for	   the	   term	  will	   only	   find	   reference	   to	  NGOs	  with	  those	  words	  in	  their	  name,	  or	  factual	  references	  to	  national	  strategies).	   	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	   surprising	  given	   that	   the	  European	  Court	  has	  made	   reference	   to	  other	   concepts	  not	  found	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention,	  and	  which	  are	  closely	  connected	  to	  transitional	  justice	  –	  such	  as	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘militant’	  or	   ‘self-­‐defending’	  democracy.	   	  There	  is	  a	  vast	  European	   jurisprudence	   engaging	  with	   domestic	   transitional	   justice	   policies	   now,	   but	  unless	  the	  European	  Court	  wrestles	  with	  the	  concept	   itself	   its	  reasoning	   is	  doomed	  to	  inconsistency.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Beshiri	  v	  Albania	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  17,	  para.	  96	  62	  Nuri	  v	  Albania	  [2009]	  ECHR	  194,	  para.	  32;	  on	  Article	  6	  see	  para.	  24.	  
